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Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams:
Part of an Emerging Trend of Supreme Court Cases Narrowing
the Scope of the ADA
Three weeks ago we celebrated our nation's Independence
Day. Today, we're here to rejoice in and celebrate another
"Independence Day," one that is long overdue. With
today's signing of the landmark Americans with Disabilities
Act, every man, woman, and child with a disability can now
pass through once-closed doors into a bright new era of
equality, independence and freedom.'
At the signing ceremony for the Americans with Disabilities Act2
("ADA") in 1990, President George H.W. Bush was hopeful that
equality for Americans with disabilities finally had been reached.
The ADA, however, has failed to fulfill its promise. Since its
enactment, the Supreme Court has begun to narrow the scope and
coverage of the ADA. Consistent with this narrowing trend, on
January 8, 2002, the Supreme Court limited the scope of the ADA
further with its decision in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky,
Inc. v. Williams.' Toyota follows several Supreme Court decisions in
the late 1990s which narrowed the ADA's definition of "disability." 4
Toyota's holding furthers the emerging Supreme Court trend to
1. President George H.W. Bush, Equality of Opportunity: The Making of the
Americans with Disabilities Act-President Bush's Remarks at the Signing, NAT'L
COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/equality-2.html
(last visited Sept. 5, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter
Equality of Opportunity].
2. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (2000)).
3. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
4. For cases narrowing the scope of the ADA, see infra notes 43-61 and
accompanying text (discussing Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding
that employee plaintiffs who suffered from severe myopia were not disabled under the
ADA because mitigating measures could be taken to improve their poor vision) and
Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (holding that employee plaintiff
did not qualify as disabled under the ADA because plaintiff's high blood pressure did not
substantially limit his major life activities when mitigating measures were taken)). For a
further example of the inability of individuals with a disability to qualify as disabled under
the ADA due to mitigating measures, see Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555
(1999) (stating that plaintiff's subconscious compensation for his monocular vision must be
considered as a mitigating measure).
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decrease the number of Americans with disabilities covered by the
ADA.'
Although the Court's decision in Toyota follows the trend to
restrict the application of the ADA, this Recent Development argues
that the Court failed to adhere to precedent regarding the issue of
"major life activities" and incorrectly analyzed congressional
intentions to provide a statute covering a broad range of disabilities.6
The Court should have followed precedent holding that the definition
of "major life activities" under the ADA's definition of "disability"
was not to be restricted to daily activities, but that significant activities
would satisfy the test.7
In analyzing the Court's incorrect decision in Toyota, this Recent
Development will first discuss the history of the ADA and its
evolution from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. It also will review the
definition of "disability" under the ADA and the Supreme Court's
broad interpretation of "major life activities" in Bragdon v. Abbott.
Next, the Recent Development will discuss the recent trend to narrow
the "disability" definition of the ADA, beginning with the decisions
in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.' and Murphy v. United Parcel Service,
Inc.9 Against this background, this Recent Development will analyze
the Supreme Court's decision in Toyota as establishing a trend of
limiting the coverage of the ADA. Finally, this Recent Development
will conclude by exploring the effects of the restrictive Toyota
decision.
The initial groundbreaking legislation for Americans with
disabilities occurred with the passage of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.10 The Act's main purpose was to allocate funds to vocational
5. See infra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
7. The holding in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998), broadly construed the
term "major life activities," which is part of the ADA's three-pronged definition of a
"disability." Id. at 638. The first prong of the ADA's definition of "disability" is that an
individual has a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities of such individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(A) (2000). Therefore, the
way in which the Court construes the term "major life activities" determines whether a
person is disabled under the ADA.
8. 527 U.S. 471 (1999). For a more detailed discussion of the Sutton case, see Sarah
Gagne Holmes, The Supreme Court Reverses the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's Directive that Disability Determinations Should Be Made Without Regard to
Mitigating Measures: Sutton v. United Airlines, 52 ME. L. REV. 425, 427-34 (2000).
9. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
10. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b (2000)); see Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding
Major Life Activities: The Failure of the "Disability" Definition in the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1419-20 (1999).
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rehabilitation programs,1 but the Act also included a single sentence
prohibiting discrimination." This sentence provides that "[n]o
otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as
defined in section 7(6), shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance."' 3 Although the Rehabilitation Act was a
milestone in the movement toward equality for Americans with
disabilities, disabled rights advocates wanted greater legal
protection. 4  Advocates lobbied for legislation to combat
discrimination, not only through federally funded programs, but also
through private entities. 5 Finally, in 1990, Congress increased the
scope of civil rights protection for Americans with disabilities through
the passage of the ADA. 6 Specifically, the ADA protects individuals
11. Rehabilitation Act, § 3, 87 Stat. at 357; Eichhorn, supra note 10, at 1419.
12. § 504, 87 Stat. at 395 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000)).
13. Id.
14. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was the first piece of federal legislation that
explicitly prohibited discrimination against people with disabilities. Eichhorn, supra note
10, at 1419. For further explanation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, see generally
Kathleen D. Henry, Civil Rights and the Disabled: A Comparison of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 in the Employment Setting, 54 ALB.
L. REV. 123 (1989) (reviewing the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act in the context of a
comparison with the ADA). The Rehabilitation Act has been amended several times,
including a 1974 amendment to redefine a "handicapped individual" as one who "(A) has
a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's
major life activities, (B) has a record of such an impairment, or (C) is regarded as having
such an impairment." Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516,
§ 111(a), 88 Stat. 1617, 1619 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (2000)).
15. Henry, supra note 14, at 125. In 1986, disability rights gained another victory with
the National Council on Disability report entitled Toward Independence: An Assessment
of Federal Laws and Programs Affecting Persons with Disabilities-With Legislative
Recommendations. See U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Sharing the Dream: Is the ADA
Accommodating All?, Chapter 1 The Road to the ADA (Oct. 2000), at
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/ada/chl.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
The report proposed a "national, comprehensive approach to the disability policy," which
eventually led to the drafting of the ADA. Id.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (2000); see Equality of Opportunity, supra note 1; see
also Paul Steven Miller, The Evolving ADA, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 3, 11 (Peter David Blanck ed., 2000) ("Like the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the ADA signals a unique opportunity for all individuals to join
together in breaking down long-standing myths about disabilities and building more
inclusive communities."). The Act has been "hailed as the greatest single achievement of
the disability rights movement to date." Eichhorn, supra note 10, at 1423. For a
discussion on the history of the ADA, see id. at 1407-23 and Holmes, supra note 8. For a
detailed discussion of the origins of the ADA, see Equality of Opportunity: The Making
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroomlpublications/equality.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002) (on
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with disabilities ,from discrimination in employment, 7  public
services,18 and public accommodations and services operated by
private entities. 9
Under the ADA's three-pronged definition of "disability," "[tihe
term 'disability' means, with respect to an individual-(A) a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment."2
In enacting the ADA, Congress used the same definition of
"disability" as that provided in the Rehabilitation Act as amended in
1974.21 Congress intended the definition to be comprehensive and
file with the North Carolina Law Review) (discussing the foundation of the ADA, the
development of a workable ADA, and the actual signing of the ADA into law).
The ADA provides that the remedies and procedures under Title I, Employment,
and Title III, Public Accommodations & Services Operated by Private Entities, are the
same as those provided under the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See § 12,117 (stating that the
remedies and procedures regarding employment discrimination are those found in 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, 2000e-9); id. § 12,188 (listing the remedies
and procedures for public accommodations and services as those found in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a-3(a)). Remedies include compensatory and punitive damages, as well as
injunctive relief and attorney fees. Mary L. Topliff, Annotation, Remedies Available
Under Americans with Disabilities Act, 136 A.L.R. FED. 63, 63 (1997). Additionally,
"compensatory damages and injunctive relief are available in actions brought by the
Attorney General, as well as attorneys' fees." Id.
For an overview of the ADA, see generally Herbert E. Gerson & J. Gregory
Addison, Handicapped Discrimination Law and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 11
Miss. C. L. REV. 233 (1990) (giving an overview of the main ADA provisions); Penn
Lerblance, Introducing the Americans with Disabilities Act: Promises and Challenges, 27
U.S.F. L. REV. 149 (1992) (discussing in-depth all titles of the ADA); Todd J. Sanders,
Handicap Legislation, 43 MERCER L. REV. 63 (1991) (discussing Title III, the public
accommodations portion of the ADA).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,111-12,117. Title I of the ADA protects an individual with a
disability from job discrimination based on that disability. Id. § 12,112. The ADA also
requires employers to provide reasonable accommodation to qualified job applicants and
employees. Id. § 12,112(b)(5)(A). Potential remedies for employer discrimination include
"hiring, promotion, reinstatement, back pay, or reasonable accommodation, including
reassignment." U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, The ADA: Your
Employment Rights as an Individual with a Disability, at
http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/ada18.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2002) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,131-12,165.
19. Id. §§ 12,181-12,189. Americans with disabilities are ensured "access to public
accommodations such as restaurants, hotels, shopping centers and offices." Equality of
Opportunity, supra note 1 (quoting President George H.W. Bush's statement of the main
purposes of the ADA in his speech at the signing of the Act).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2).
21. See Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, § 111(a), 88 Stat.
1617, 1619 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (2000)); H.R. REP. NO. 101-
485(111), at 27 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 450.
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chose not to limit its scope by listing specific disabilities that the ADA
would cover.22 Congress's intent to define "disability" to cover a
broad range of individuals is important to the actions brought under
the ADA because a plaintiff must qualify as "disabled" to receive
protection.23
Although Toyota follows the Supreme Court's recent trend of
narrowing the scope of the ADA,24 the Toyota holding departs from
the precedent set in Bragdon v. Abbott25 that established a broad
standard for determining what constitutes a "major life activity." The
Supreme Court's 1998 decision in Bragdon evinced hope of a more
permissive interpretation of the "disability" definition under the
ADA, when it broadly construed the scope of major life activities.26
In Bragdon, a woman with HIV sued her dentist under the public
accommodation section of the ADA for refusing to fill her cavity at
his office.27 The Court held that the HIV positive woman qualified as
disabled under the ADA because she was limited in the major life
activity of reproduction.28 Prior to Bragdon, courts were split over
the issue of reproduction as a major life activity and employed
different interpretations of the meaning of "major life activities. '29 In
22. Congress also wanted an expansive definition of "disability" so the ADA could
encompass future disorders. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(111), at 27, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,450.
23. "[T]he way in which the statute defines 'disability' can make or break a given
claim." Eichhorn, supra note 10, at 1427.
24. See infra notes 43-61 and accompanying text.
25. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
26. See Alphonso B. David, Note, Bragdon v. Abbott: The Supreme Court Redefines
"Disability" Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 9 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV.
109, 125-26 (1999) (finding that Bragdon shows the Court's approval of a case-by-case
approach in determining whether a plaintiff has a disability); Sarah Lynn Oquist,
Casenote, Reproduction Constitutes a "Major Life Activity" under the ADA: Implications
of the Supreme Court's Decision in Bragdon v. Abbott, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1357,
1411-12 (1999) (stating that the Supreme Court applied a broad definition of "major life
activities" in Bragdon).
27. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 629 (stating that the dentist offered to fill the cavity in a
hospital at no extra charge except for the hospital fee for using its facilities).
28. Id. at 641.
29. For a sampling of cases finding reproduction is a major life activity, see Pacourek
v. Inland Steel Co., 916 F. Supp. 797, 802 (N.D. I11. 1996); Erickson v. Bd. of Governors,
911 F. Supp. 316, 323 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310,
1321 (E.D. Pa. 1994). Cases holding that reproduction is not a major life activity include
Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N.A., 123 F.3d 156, 172 (4th Cir. 1997); Krauel v.
Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996); Zatarain v. WDSU-Television,
Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995), aff'd, 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996). For
discussion of Bragdon and the split between courts prior to Bragdon concerning
reproduction, see Alan J. Ocheltree, Casenote, Bragdon v. Abbott, 25 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
183, 195-96 (1999); Oquist, supra note 26, at 1385-1401.
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these prior decisions, courts interpreted "major life activities" in two
different ways: "(1) a broad definition-a significant activity that is
'comparatively important,' or (2) a narrow definition-a significant
activity that is 'engaged in with the same degree of frequency as the
listed activities.' "30 An example of a decision denying reproduction
as a major life activity and employing a narrow definition of "major
life activities" is Zatarain v. WDSU-Televisions, Inc.31 In Zatarain,
the court reasoned that reproduction was not a major life activity
because it was not an activity in which a person engaged on a daily
basis.32 In a contrary case, Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., Inc.," the
court held that reproduction was a major life activity and condemned
the decision in Zatarain as interpreting the definition of "major life
activities" "far too narrowly."34 The Pacourek court declined to limit
major life activities to daily activities and held that a broader
interpretation focusing on the significance of an activity should be the
standard.35
The Supreme Court resolved the issue of how to interpret "major
life activities" and, specifically, whether reproduction is a major life
activity, in its decision in Bragdon. The Court followed reasoning
similar to that used in the Pacourek case and broadly defined "major
life activities" in terms of an activity's significance.36 In its analysis,
the Court gave meaning to "major life activities" beyond those listed
in the Rehabilitation Act regulations.37 By holding that an activity's
significance must be weighed, "the opinion permit[ted] lower courts
to assess the comparative significance of any activities that the
30. Oquist, supra note 26, at 1411-12 (explaining that the second definition is more
narrow because the activity, in addition to being significant, must also be engaged in with
great frequency to daily life).
31. 881 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. La. 1995), aff'd, 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996).
32. Id. at 243 ("[A] person is not called upon to reproduce throughout the day, every
day.").
33. 916 F. Supp. 797 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
34. Id. at 804.
35. See id.
36. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998) ("[T]he plain meaning of the word
'major' denotes comparative importance" and "suggest[s] that the touchstone for
determining an activity's inclusion under the statutory rubric is its significance.").
37. See Eichhorn, supra note 10, at 1440-41. The Department of Health and Human
Services issued regulations defining "major life activities" under the Rehabilitation Act:
" 'Major life activities' means functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (2002). After the passage of the ADA, the EEOC was given authority to
enforce Title I regarding employment discrimination issues and the EEOC has adopted
verbatim the definition of "major life activities" under the Rehabilitation Act regulations.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2)(i) (2002).
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plaintiffs might raise."38 Thus, the Court broadened the "disability"
definition under the ADA by holding that reproduction is a major life
activity and defining a "major life activity" as one that is significant.39
However, this broad interpretation of "major life activities" was
short-lived; any hope of broader coverage for individuals under the
ADA after Bragdon was destroyed in the subsequent Supreme Court
cases, which limited the range of qualifying disabilities.4"
Unfortunately for Americans with disabilities, over the past
several years, the Supreme Court began a new trend in interpreting
the definition of "disability," which prohibits many potential ADA
claims.41 In 1999, the Supreme Court began to interpret the scope of
the definition in favor of employers by restricting the number of
individuals who qualify as disabled under the ADA.42 These 1999
cases started a trend that narrowed the scope of the ADA.
In 1999, the narrowing trend began with the Supreme Court
decisions in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.43 and Murphy v. United
Parcel Service, Inc.44 In Sutton, twin sisters sued United Airlines for
38. Eichhorn, supra note 10, at 1440.
39. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641.
40. See infra notes 43-84 and accompanying text.
41. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 184 (2002) (holding
that major life activities are those activities of central importance to daily life); Sutton v.
United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 471-72 (1999) (holding that employee plaintiffs who
suffered from severe myopia were not disabled under the ADA because mitigating
measures could be taken to improve their poor vision); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 516-17 (1999) (holding that employee plaintiff did not qualify as
disabled under the ADA because plaintiff's high blood pressure did not substantially limit
his major life activities when mitigating measures were taken).
Sutton and Murphy narrow the scope of the ADA and are a departure from the
broader definition of "disability" in Bragdon. However, Bragdon carried only a narrow
majority of the Court; the decision was 5-4. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the
Court, and Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at
627. In Sutton and Murphy, the decisions were 7-2, with only Justice Stevens filing a
dissenting opinion in each case, in which Justice Breyer joined. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 474;
Murphy, 527 U.S. at 517. Finally, in Toyota, the Court delivered a unanimous decision,
thereby cementing its progression toward a more narrow interpretation Of the ADA.
Toyota, 534 U.S. at 186.
42. See infra notes 43-59. In Sutton and Murphy, the Court narrowed the class of
individuals covered by the ADA with its holding that an individual who takes steps to
mitigate his disability is not "disabled" under the ADA. The Court reasoned that the
ADA statute requires an individual to be "presently-not potentially or hypothetically-
substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disability." Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
43. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 471-72. For a more detailed discussion of the Sutton case, see
Holmes, supra note 8.
44. Murphy, 527 U.S. at 516; see Mark C. Rahdert, Arline's Ghost: Some Notes on
Working as a Major Life Activity Under the ADA, 9 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 303,
303 (2000) (stating that Sutton and Murphy "reflect growing judicial concern over the
potential breadth of the beneficiary class of Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990").
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terminating their interviews to become pilots because they suffered
from severe myopia." Although the use of corrective lenses gave the
women perfect vision, United Airlines refused to hire them because
they did not meet its minimum uncorrected vision requirement.46 The
plaintiffs argued that the Court should follow the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") guidelines, which stated that
corrective measures were not to be taken into account in determining
whether an individual was "substantially limited in a major life
activity."47 The Court held, contrary to the EEOC,48 that corrective
and mitigating circumstances should be taken into consideration in
determining whether someone is considered to be disabled.49
Consequently, the Court determined that the women were not
disabled under the ADA.5"
On the same day the Supreme Court handed down Sutton, it
decided Murphy. In Murphy, UPS fired one of its employees because
his blood pressure exceeded the Department of Transportation's
requirements for drivers of commercial vehicles. 1 Reiterating the
Sutton holding, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals's
holding that the plaintiff was not disabled under the ADA. The
Court stated that mitigating measures must be taken into account
when determining whether an individual is disabled under the
ADA.53 Because the plaintiff was not substantially limited in any
45. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475-76.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 481.
48. The Supreme Court has not decided what level of deference should be given to
the EEOC guidelines regarding the ADA. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams,
534 U.S. 184, 194 (2002); see also Sutton, 527 U.S. at 471, 480 (noting that the parties to the
suit accepted the EEOC regulations as valid and, therefore, the Court did not consider
what deference should be given to the guidelines). But see Bragdon v. Abbott 524 U.S.
624, 646 (1998) (giving deference to the Justice Department's regulations regarding Title
III of the ADA in its decision that HIV substantially limits the major life activity of
reproduction); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984) (stating that agency regulations are to be "given controlling weight unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute"). Following the reasoning that
the "ADA is supposed to follow legislative history from the Rehabilitation Act ... the
Court should be bound by agency deference and would be required to give stronger
weight to the EEOC Interpretive Guidelines." Allison Duncan, Note, Defining Disability
in the ADA: Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 60 LA. L. REV. 967, 975 (2000).
49. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475; Phil Clements et al., United States: Supreme Court
Restricts ADA Definition of "Disability", MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, July 20, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 2824823:
50. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475.
51. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 520 (1999).
52. Id. at 521.
53. Id.
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major life activities when he used medication to control his
hypertension, he did not qualify as disabled under the ADA.54
The Court's decisions in Sutton and Murphy narrowed the scope
of the ADA by excluding those persons with disabilities who use
mitigating measures. For example, an individual suffering from
epilepsy was denied coverage under the ADA because he took
medicine to control his seizures.55 The court followed Sutton's
reasoning and denied the man coverage, despite evidence that he
suffered seizures at least once a week, even while taking medication.56
In addition to individuals with epilepsy, courts have denied coverage
under the ADA for persons using mitigating measures to combat
sleep apnea57 and blood cancer." After Sutton and Murphy,
individuals with disabilities who take medication or use other
mitigating measures will not be able to rely on the ADA to protect
them from discrimination. These individuals, like the employees in
Sutton and Murphy, will fail to qualify under the ADA but may still
be considered too disabled to perform their jobs. If the Court
continues to reduce the coverage of the ADA, more and more
Americans with disabilities will be excluded from the ADA's
coverage and be subjected to this "Catch-22" situation.59
The Supreme Court began restricting ADA coverage when it
held that individuals who can take mitigating measures to help their
disabilities are not qualified as disabled under the ADA. The
limitation of ADA coverage in Sutton and Murphy has emerged as a
trend with the Supreme Court's most recent decision, Toyota Motor
54. Id.
55. Todd v. Acad. Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 448,454 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
56. Id. at 452-53.
57. Taylor v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Texas, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 604, 611 (N.D.
Tex. 1999).
58. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645, 655
(5th Cir. 1999).
59. See Holmes, supra note 8, at 443 (stating that Sutton creates a "Catch-22"
situation); Julie McDonnell, Note, Sutton v. United Air Lines: Unfairly Narrowing the
Scope of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 471, 472 (2000) ("These
decisions create the absurd situation where a person is disabled enough to be fired, but not
disabled enough to seek redress under the ADA."). Holmes also stresses in her article
that individuals who use mitigating measures are not completely healed and may need
reasonable accommodations at work, which they will be unable to get under the ADA
because they are not covered. Holmes, supra note 8, at 443. "For example, a diabetic
individual may require additional breaks throughout the work day for insulin injections.
An employer could deny an employee reasonable accommodations and not fear liability
for discrimination because the employee would be excluded from the protection provided
by the ADA according to Sutton." Id.
2003]
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Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams.6" In Toyota, the Court
contradicted its own holding in Bragdon and restricted the definition
of "disability" by limiting the definition of "major life activity" from
an activity that is significant, to an activity that is daily.6
The plaintiff in Toyota, Williams, had been an assembly line
worker for Toyota since 1990.62 She brought suit against Toyota
under the ADA, alleging that Toyota failed to reasonably
accommodate her carpal tunnel syndrome.63 Soon after beginning her
job at Toyota, Williams developed carpal tunnel syndrome, then
Toyota assigned her to modified jobs to accommodate her
condition.64  Eventually, Williams was assigned to the "Quality
Control Inspection Operations" ("QCIO") team.65 The QCIO team
job consisted of four tasks: assembly paint, second inspection paint,
shell body audit, and ED surface repair.66 Williams performed only
the first two tasks, which did not entail much use of her hands and
arms.67
Starting in 1996, Toyota required its employees to rotate through
all four stations.68 Williams, therefore, was required to perform tasks
using her hands and arms for extended periods.69 Often Williams had
to hold her arms around shoulder height for several hours, causing
severe pain in her shoulders and neck.70 Williams was diagnosed with
numerous medical conditions affecting her upper body;7' thus, she
60. See McDonnell, supra note 59, at 483-85 (arguing that the Sutton and Murphy
decisions narrowed the scope of the ADA); Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund,
U.S. Supreme Court Further Constricts Power of the ADA (Jan. 9, 2002), at
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=949 (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) [hegeinafter Lambda] (stating that the ruling in Toyota,
"refusing to recognize workplace-related limitations, further erodes the definition of
'disability' and the strength of employee protections under the Americans with Disabilities
Act").
61. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184,197-98 (2002)
62. Id. at 187.
63. Id. at 187-90.
64. Id. at 188.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. Williams did not perform the other two tasks because they caused her
condition to worsen. Id. at 189; Juan Otero, Supreme Court Clarifies 'Disabled Worker'
Under ADA, NATION'S CITIES WKLY., Jan. 14, 2002, at 2.
68. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 189.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Williams was diagnosed with "myotendinitis bilateral periscapular, an
inflammation of the muscles and tendons around both of her shoulder blades;
myotendinitis and myositis bilateral forearms with nerve compression causing median
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asked Toyota to accommodate her medical problems by placing her
in the original jobs she did with the QCIO team, namely, those
positions requiring little or no use of her hands and arms.
According to Williams, Toyota refused her request.73 As a result of
Toyota's refusal to accommodate her medical condition, Williams
filed suit under the ADA.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Williams
qualified as disabled under the ADA.74 According to the court,
performing manual tasks constituted a major life activity. The court
found that Williams was unable to perform numerous manual tasks
that required extensive use of her hands and arms.76 Because
Williams could not perform a class of manual tasks, she satisfied the
ADA's requirement of being substantially limited in a major life
activity.
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision and
held that Williams failed to qualify as disabled under the ADA.77 In
so doing, the Court revisited the question raised in Bragdon as to
what constitutes a "major life activity" under the ADA's definition of
"disability." Instead of following its decision in Bragdon, the majority
chose to narrow the definition of a "major life activity." The Court
held that a major life activity "refers to those activities that are of
central importance to daily life,"78 instead of those activities that are
significant. The Supreme Court noted that the court of appeals
wrongly focused on Williams's "inability to perform manual tasks
associated only with her job."79  Rather, the Court held that the
correct inquiry was whether Williams could perform "tasks of central
nerve irritation; and thoracic outlet compression, a condition that causes pain in the nerves
that lead to the upper extremities." Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Williams v. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., 2000 FED App. 0287A, 4 (6th Cir.), 224
F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir. 2000), rev'd, 534 U.S. 184, 197-98 (2002).
75. Id. The appellate court reasoned that Williams was substantially limited in the
major life activity of performing manual tasks because Williams showed that her "manual
disability involves a 'class' of manual activities affecting the ability to perform tasks at
work." Id. Unlike the Supreme Court, the appellate court looked at the plaintiff's
ability/inability to perform tasks related to her work, not daily chores. Id. In its reasoning,
the court relied upon the wording of the ADA, the EEOC's interpretation of the ADA,
and the Supreme Court's analysis of "working" under Sutton. Id. at 842-43.
76. Id. at 842.
77. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 203.
78. Id. at 197.
79. Id. at 200.
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importance to people's daily lives," such as bathing or brushing
teeth.80
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, stated that the terms
within the definition of "disability" had to be strictly interpreted "to
create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled."'" Her
statement confirmed the Court's earlier actions in Sutton and
Murphy, which narrowed the scope of individuals qualifying as
disabled under the ADA.82 Justice O'Connor proclaimed that
Congress did not intend for everyone with a disease or impairment to
be protected under the ADA.8 3 The Court reasoned that Congress's
statement at the beginning of the ADA finding that forty-three
million Americans have disabilities meant that the number of people
covered by the ADA could not exceed that finding.84
The Court's view, however, contradicts Congress's true intent
that the ADA cover a broad range of disabilities. Congress's intent is
evidenced by statements made in the congressional record during the
process of enacting the ADA,85 as well as by the wording of the ADA
itself.86 According to Representative Steny Hoyer, who championed
the ADA in the House of Representatives, Congress stated that the
number of disabled Americans was forty-three million to show the
breadth of the legislation coverage, not to limit it. 7 He also noted
that "it was important to protect not only people who had genuine
80. Id. at 202.
81. Id. at 197.
82. See supra notes 43-59 and accompanying text.
83. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197 ("If Congress intended everyone with a physical
impairment that precluded the performance of some isolated, unimportant, or particularly
difficult manual task to qualify as disabled, the number of disabled Americans would
surely have been much higher.").
84. Id.
85. See infra note 87.
86. See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text; see also Eichhorn, supra note 10, at
1434 (citing a recent study by the American Bar Association's Commission on Mental and
Physical Disability Law as saying that the "disability" definition of the ADA is "much
more restrictive than those who drafted and supported the ADA had thought it would
be").
87. Steny H. Hoyer, Editorial, Not Exactly What We Intended, Justice O'Connor,
WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2002, at Bl; see also 136 CONG. REC. E1630 (daily ed. May 21,1990)
(statement of Rep. Glenn Poshard of Illinois in House of Rep.). In support of the ADA,
Representative Poshard of the Illinois House of Representatives stated that the United
States was "no longer willing to ignore the 43 million or more Americans who may be
described as disabled." Id. One could conclude that Congress's forty-three million
number is much higher than the number of those who are severely disabled and, therefore,
Congress must have intended to include within the ADA those who were not severely
disabled.
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trouble functioning normally, but people whose employers might
wrongly perceive as being substantially impaired."88
The wording used in the ADA also shows Congress's intent to
cover a broad number of individuals with disabilities."9 The language
of the ADA demonstrates the hope for an. encompassing statute by
stating that its purpose is to "provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities." 9°  Furthermore, the definition of
"disability" shows Congress's intent to encompass a broad range of
disabilities. Congress used the Rehabilitation Act's definition of
"disability" so that the definition could adapt to presently unknown
future disabilities.91 If Congress meant for the definition to be
adaptable, surely it foresaw the occurrence of new disabilities and, as
a result, a greater number of disabled individuals in the future.
Furthermore, by including the "record of" and "regarded as"
categories in its definition of "disability," Congress expected the
ADA to protect individuals without, in the Court's words, "actual
disabilities," meaning those individuals not counted in the forty-three
million number relied upon by the Toyota majority.
2
Not only is the Court's analysis in Toyota contrary to the
congressional purpose behind the ADA, it is also contrary to the
reasoning in Bragdon, where the Court specifically attached a broad
definition to the term "disability" through its interpretation of "major
life activities. '93  In Bragdon, the Court relied upon the
Rehabilitation Act in its analysis,94 stating that "[r]ather than
enunciating a general principle for determining what is and is not a
major life activity, the Rehabilitation Act regulations instead provide
a representative list, defining the term to include 'functions such as
88. Hoyer, supra note 87. Hoyer further proclaimed: "Is this what we had in mind
when we passed the ADA-that lawyers for businesses and individuals should spend their
time and money arguing about whether people can brush their teeth and take out the
garbage? Not at all." Id.
89. "Nowhere does the language of the ADA require that its application be limited to
a narrow class of individuals." McDonnell, supra note 59, at 484.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(b)(1) (2000).
91. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
92. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 512 (1999) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also Holmes, supra note 8, at 444 (discussing the "forty-three million
number"); McDonnell, supra note 59, at 483-84 (same); supra note 87 and accompanying
text (same).
93. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
94. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638-39 (1998).
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caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.' "'
Contrary to Bragdon, the Court in Toyota imposed its own
standard for determining what constitutes a "major life activity."
Justice O'Connor specifically stated that major life activities are
"those activities that are of central importance to daily life."96 The
Court in Bragdon, however, found that activities need not involve
public, economic, or daily activities to be "major" life activities.97
Once again, the Toyota Court broke from precedent by focusing on
activities that are performed on a "daily" basis.98
The Court's decision in Toyota to limit the coverage of the ADA
will have a significant impact on the number of individuals who will
qualify as disabled under the ADA.99 The impact of Toyota is
important for society to understand because it further limits an
already ineffective ADA. Studies conducted in the mid-1990s, before
the onset of the recent trend of narrowing the scope of the ADA,
showed that plaintiffs under the ADA lost at least ninety percent of
their actions, "mostly on the grounds that they are not disabled
enough."'' 0 These statistics will certainly rise following the Toyota
decision. The ADA was enacted to combat discrimination against
individuals with disabilities who historically had been isolated by
society. 10 Although the ADA was hailed as the most important civil
95. Id.; see 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (2002).
96. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184,197 (2002).
97. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638. The Toyota Court upheld the same argument that it
struck down in Bragdon. The dentist in Bragdon argued that the women with HIV did not
meet the "major life activities" part of the "disability" definition because "Congress
intended the ADA only to cover those aspects of a person's life which have a public,
economic, or daily character." Id. (citations omitted). According to the dentist's
argument, although reproduction was important, it could not be deemed a major life
activity because it was not a public, economic, or daily activity. Id. The Court in Bragdon
responded that "[n]othing in the definition suggests that activities without a public,
economic, or daily dimension may somehow be regarded as so unimportant or
insignificant as to fall outside the meaning of the word 'major.' " Id. The Supreme Court
in Toyota ignored the decision in Bragdon and held that major life activities must be
"daily" activities. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197.
98. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197.
99. "With a clearer and more constricted concept of 'disability' now in place,
nonsevere impairments that previously may have been thought to be covered by the ADA
should now be found outside the scope of the statute's protection." Jeffrey S. Klein &
Nicholas J. Pappas, Constricted Coverage of American with Disabilities Act After 'Toyota,'
N.Y. L.J., Feb. 4, 2002, at 3.
100. Hoyer, supra note 87; see also Miller, supra note 16, at 13 n.19 (citing a 1998
American Bar Association study showing that employers have won ninety-two percent of
ADA cases under Title I).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a)(2) (2000).
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rights legislation since the Civil Rights Act of 1964,02 it has not lived
up to its promise. The Toyota decision, like Sutton and Murphy,
limits the class of individuals who may qualify as disabled under the
ADA. Qualification is the only way an individual will receive
protection under the ADA. °3 Although the ADA is civil rights
legislation and carries the same remedies as those in the Civil Rights
Act," it is much more difficult for a plaintiff to establish coverage
under the ADA. The ADA has stringent eligibility requirements,
unlike the Civil Rights Act, that must be passed in order for an
individual to be qualified as "disabled.""1 5 When the Supreme Court
limited the scope of the "disability" definition in Toyota,"°6 it made it
even more difficult for an individual to be covered under the ADA.
The holding in Toyota "suggests that people must be 'truly
disabled,' i.e., visibly and functionally unable to perform in certain
specific, socially expected ways before they are entitled to the
protection of the law."'0 7 Individuals with less obvious disabilities,
like Williams's carpal tunnel syndrome, will have difficulty meeting
the rigid requirements of the new standard for what constitutes a
"major life activity." Unfortunately, those with less obvious
disabilities are often discriminated against because an employer may
assume that the individual is faking the disability or because the
employer can discriminate against someone who is not visibly
disabled, often without penalty.10
Toyota will affect more than just those people with disabilities
similar to those of Williams. Because the Court defined a "major life
activity" as one that is of central importance to daily life,109 disabled
102. Dawn V. Martin, The Americans with Disabilities Act-Introductory Comments, 8
J.L. & HEALTH 1, 1 (1993-1994).
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2).
104. See supra note 16. ,
105. See Nancy R. Murdrick, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Social Contract or
Special Privilege?: Employment Discrimination Laws for Disability: Utilization and
Outcome, 549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 53, 56 (1997).
106. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002) (finding that
major life activities were those which are "daily," not "significant").
107. Mark S. Quigley, National Council on Disability Deeply Troubled by Supreme
Court Ruling Limiting Scope of Disability Law (Jan. 8, 2002), at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/news/r02-344.html (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
108. Mike Ervin, Editorial, High Court's Setback for the Disabled, RECORD (Bergen
County, N.J.), Jan. 15, 2002, at -15.
109. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197.
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individuals now must satisfy an objective standard of "disability.""11
People suffering from HIV, for example, will have difficulty showing
that they are substantially limited in an activity that is "of central
importance to daily life." ' 1 A person "newly diagnosed with HIV
whose 'central' life activities remain largely unaffected could face
insurmountable difficulties passing the court's disability test." '112
Furthermore, one could argue that the Court's reasoning in Toyota
overrules the Bragdon decision concerning HIV because
reproduction, which Bragdon held to be a major life activity, is not of
central importance to daily life.113 Although reproduction is vital to
society, most women only reproduce once or twice in their lives, while
others never reproduce. 14  Thus, under the Court's temporal view,
reproduction would not satisfy the Toyota standard because no
woman reproduces on a daily basis."5
Another possible consequence of Toyota is the erosion of
"working" as a major life activity. Courts reviewing decisions under
the ADA have relied upon "working" as a major life activity more
than any other major life activity; its elimination would significantly
harm individuals with disabilities." 6 Whether "working" constitutes a
major life activity was briefly addressed in Sutton, but the Court did
110. This objective standard, that the activity must be of central importance to daily
life, will not encompass as many major life activities as the "significant activity" standard
in Bragdon because, after Toyota, a major life activity must be a daily activity.
111. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197; see Lambda, supra note 60 ("Application of the Court's
reasoning to a person with HIV could leave many without a viable legal remedy for a wide
range of discriminatory exclusions from work and social activities.").
112. See Lambda, supra note 60.
113. For an argument that reproduction is not a major life activity because it is not
consistent with the idea that major life activities are performed with some frequency, see
Oquist, supra note 26, at 1395-1401.
114. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, forty-three percent of women between ages
fifteen and forty-four were childless in 2000. AMARA BACHU & MARTINE O'CONNELL,
FERTILITY OF AMERICAN WOMEN: JUNE 2000, 1 (U.S. Census Bureau, Current
Population Reports No. P20-543RV, 2001), at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p20-
543rv.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The Census also reported that
women in the United States would "end their childbearing years with an average of 1.9
children" per woman. Id. at 1-3.
115. See Oquist, supra note 26, at 1395-1401.
116. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 490-94 (1999) (discussing
plaintiffs' claim that their poor eyesight substantially limited them in the major life activity
of "working"); Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 37, 49 (D. Me. 1996)
(holding that plaintiff employee suffering from chronic depression was not substantially
limited in the major life activity of "working" because plaintiff could perform other jobs
and his impairment did not prohibit him from other employment), affd, 105 F.3d 12 (1st
Cir. 1997).
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not expressly rule on the matter.117 The Court in Sutton did state,
however, that "there may be some conceptual difficulty in defining
'major life activities' to include work," leading one to believe that the
Court will rule on the issue of "working" in the future.'18
Though the majority in Toyota did not specifically decide
whether "working" qualifies as a major life activity," 9 the Court's
ruling that manual working tasks were not such activities further
erodes "working" as a major life activity.12° Although the majority of
Americans spend most of their adult lives working, the Court failed to
consider that the ability to perform a task that provides a person with
his or her livelihood is a major life activity. 2' Rather, the Court
emphasized the importance of household tasks conducted outside of
the workplace.' The Court's suggestion that simple household
chores are more important than a person's work is contrary to
common sense, as well as legislative history. 123  Toyota's reasoning
clearly shows that the Court does not believe that work and work-
related activities are so central to a person's daily life as to qualify as
major life activities.
The limited scope of the "disability" definition and the failure to
recognize the importance of work in an individual's daily life diluted
the ADA's protection from discrimination by employers. Although
the ADA prohibits employer discrimination of an individual based on
a disability, the holding in Toyota may increase employer
discrimination. The ADA will not prevent employer discrimination
unless someone is visibly disabled. Moreover, employers will be less
willing to provide accommodations for employees with ergonomic
injuries because these people will not likely qualify as disabled under
the ADA. 24 Overall, the holding in Toyota will protect employers
more than the disabled individuals the ADA was designed to protect.
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams is a
landmark decision in disability law and will have lasting effects on
117. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492. The Court did not determine whether "working" was a
major life activity because the parties conceded that "working" was a major life activity.
Id.
118. Id.
119. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 200 (2002).
120. Id.
121. Ervin, supra note 108; see also Rahdert, supra note 44, at 330 (discussing the
common-sense arguments in favor or considering working as a major life activity).
122. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 202.
123. The Rehabilitation Act Regulations specifically list "working" as an example of a
major life activity. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (2002); Eichhorn, supra note 10, at 1436.
124. Otero, supra note 67.
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litigation under the Americans with Disabilities Act. With the
holding in Toyota, the Supreme Court has furthered the trend of
limiting coverage under the ADA by requiring that individuals meet
the high standard of having a disability that affects their daily
activities. Although part of a trend, the holding in Toyota failed to
adhere to the precedent established in Bragdon v. Abbott, where the
Court held that the definition of "disability" should be interpreted
broadly to include any significant activity as a major life activity.
Toyota's holding is also inconsistent with the purpose of the ADA
and the original intentions of Congress. Congress created the ADA
to combat discrimination and protect the civil liberties of disabled
individuals. The only way to combat the Court's misguided restrictive
definition of "disability" is for Congress to pass legislation further
defining "disability" in accordance with its original intentions.
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